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Abstract
We present a new model for prediction markets, in which we use risk measures to model agents and in-
troduce a market maker to describe the trading process. This specific choice on modelling tools brings us
mathematical convenience. The analysis shows that the whole market effectively approaches a global objec-
tive, despite that the market is designed such that each agent only cares about its own goal. Additionally, the
market dynamics provides a sensible algorithm for optimising the global objective. An intimate connection
between machine learning and our markets is thus established, such that we could 1) analyse a market by ap-
plying machine learning methods to the global objective, and 2) solve machine learning problems by setting
up and running certain markets.
1 Introduction
Following the mainstream interest in “big data”, one valuable direction of machine learning is towards to build-
ing up distributed, scalable and self-incentivised systems which could organise for solving large scale problems.
Recently, prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) show the promise of being the abstract framework
for machine learners to design these systems. As one type of markets, prediction markets naturally introduce
the concepts such as self-incentivised computation and distributed environment. Additionally, the close re-
lationship between prediction markets and probabilities shed light on a new way of achieving probabilistic
modelling (Storkey, 2011).
Since Pennock and Wellman (1996), researchers have spent decades on building connections between machine
learning and prediction markets. However, this problem has still not been well solved. One reason is that the
framework of prediction markets is somehow too flexible, and in order to analyse the markets for machine
learning goals one has to first specify a market model to describe the prediction markets. The other reason
is that given a market model, we may still not know what the market is doing, even if we understand agent
behaviours and market mechanisms. As distinct from most machine learning methods which explicitly define
and optimise certain objectives, markets only introduce local objectives to each individual agent. To interpret
a market as a machine learning method, we have to find the global objective that the market aims to optimise.
This idea motivates our work.
Instead of just focusing on market mechanisms (Chen and Vaughan, 2010), we would like to incorporate the
agents and analyse our market as a whole. This setting is similar to (Storkey, 2011; Penna et al., 2012; Barbu
and Lay, 2012); but unlike Barbu and Lay (2012), we will build a model on agent behaviours; and unlike
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Storkey (2011) and Penna et al. (2012), we model agents using risk measures, which makes our markets ana-
lytical.
The novel results of this paper are:
• establishing a new prediction market model which both inherits the strengths of prediction markets and
has mathematical convenience;
• giving explicitly the global objective that the market aims to optimise as a whole, and interpreting the
market trading process as a sequential optimisation procedure of the global objective;
• strengthening the intimate connections between machine learning and markets by showing that the mar-
ket effectively solves the dual of certain machine learning problems.
2 A General Prediction Market Setup
Let Ω be the space of all possible future states. We say a prediction market is built on Ω if it trades securi-
ties associated with the future state ω ∈ Ω. Specifically, securities are defined as a set of random variables
{ξk(·)} = {ξ1(·), ξ2(·) . . . , ξK(·)}. Each ξk(·) : Ω → R is a payment function, that is, one unit of this se-
curity will pay to the holder ξk(ω) if ω turns out to be the future state. This definition is quite general, and
securities defined in this way are also referred to as complex securities (Abernethy et al., 2013). We require
that all securities {ξk(·)} (collected into the vector ξ(·)) are linearly independent, that is, for a ∈ RK , we have
a · ξ(·) = 0 only if a = 0. If they are not, then we can always pick a subset {ξk′(·)} of linearly independent
securities from {ξk(·)} such that all the other securities in {ξk(·)} can be represented by the linear combination
of {ξk′(·)} (Kreyszig, 2007). Therefore it is redundant to consider {ξk(·)} that are not linearly independent.
As an example, the Arrow-Debreu security is a special case of complex securities. When the sample space Ω
is discrete and contains only finite number of states, Arrow-Debreu securities are a set of K = |Ω| securities,
in which the k-th one pays one unit if the k-th state is true: ξk(ω) = 1(ω = k). Note that in general cases
K < |Ω|, e.g. when the value of ω is continuous, there will be infinite number of states but we always have a
finite K for practice.
Agents can only trade these predefined securities. The behaviour of an agent is characterised by its portfolio
{w, sk} = {w, s1, s2, . . . , sK}, where w is the amount of money that the agent has, and sk is the amount of
shares the agent holds in security k. We collect all sk into vector s. If an agent has a portfolio {w, sk}, the total
payment of the securities is
X(·) = s · ξ(·), (2.1)
where X(·) : Ω → R is in essence a random variable on Ω. We call X(·) the risky asset because of its
uncertainty and w the risk-free asset. The gross payment is thus
Xˆ(·) = w + s · ξ(·) = w +X(·), (2.2)
which is also a random variable. We call Xˆ(·) the (gross) asset. Denote X the set of allX(·) that are accessible
for an agent, and similarly Xˆ the set of all Xˆ(·). Notice that since {ξk(·)} are linearly independent, there exists
a unique map (bijection) between X(·) and s via (2.1). Therefore a portfolio could also be represented by
{w,X(·)}. In our setting X ⊆ span(ξ1(·), ξ2(·) . . . , ξK(·)), but it is possible to make X more abstract, which
is not a space spanned by a prefixed number of securities but allows new security types to be added on the fly.
This discussion is beyond our scope.
A market consists of two processes, that 1) each agent chooses a portfolio {w,X(·)} it would like to hold, and
2) agents try to move to their preferred portfolio by trading. To describe the decision making process we need
a model of portfolio selection, while to describe trading we need to specify a market mechanism. These two
parts will be discussed in Section 3 and 4.
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Later in this paper, when the context is clear we will omit parentheses and write a random variable in an
uppercase letter, e.g.X (except the securities, which are denoted by ξ), and use the lowercase of the same letter
for the value of it, e.g. x. We will also write functionals in letters without any parentheses.
3 Preferences on Assets
Agents select assets based on their preferences. An agent’s preference order of two assets is measured by
a functional f : Xˆ → R, such that the agent prefers one asset Xˆ than the other asset Yˆ if and only if
f(Xˆ) > f(Yˆ ), and that the agent is indifferent between X and Y if and only if f(Xˆ) = f(Yˆ ). There are
plenty of theories on choosing and analysing a specific form of f . These includes expected utility theory
(EUT) (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007), dual utility theory (Yaari, 1987), risk measures (Artzner et al.,
1999), etc. EUT is perhaps the most popular theories in economics and game theory, while risk measures are
commonly seen in finance literature. We choose to use risk measures to model agent behaviours. We introduce
risk measures in this section, while putting the detailed justification of using risk measures and its relation to
EUT in Section 6.
3.1 Risk measures
As is indicated by their name, risk measures assign higher scores to assets that are more “risky”. They can also
be understood as measures of the potential loss of choosing certain asset. A (monetary) risk measure is defined
as a functional ρ : X → R such that ρ(0) is finite and ρ satisfies the following conditions (Artzner et al., 1999):
Translation invariance If X ∈ X and m ∈ R, then
ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m. (3.1)
Monotonicity If X,Y ∈ X and X ≤ Y , then
ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ). (3.2)
Here X ≤ Y should be understood as P (x ≤ y) = 1, that is, with the probability of one that X will generate a
lower return than Y . Thus monotonicity indicates that an asset with a better return deserves a lower risk. Due
to translation invariance, a risk measure maps any risk-free asset to itself, and is additive w.r.t. any risk-free
asset. Therefore, the output of a risk measure has the same unit with a risk-free asset, and can be calculated
like an asset.
The domains of risk measures and the preference functional f are different, as risk measures are defined on
X while the space of assets that agent can hold is Xˆ . Fortunately, we could easily extend the definition to the
domain Xˆ by applying translation invariance (3.1)
ρ(Xˆ) = ρ(X + w) = ρ(X)− w, ∀Xˆ ∈ Xˆ . (3.3)
A corresponding f can thus be obtained by f = −ρ.
Risk measures are very generic. In our discussion we will use both risk measures and a specific class of them,
the convex risk measures (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2002). A risk measure is convex if ∀X1, X2 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1]
ρ(λX1 + (1− λ)X2) ≤ λρ(X1) + (1− λ)ρ(X2). (3.4)
It says that the risk of a combination of two assets should not be higher than holding them separately. In other
words, convex risk measures encourage diversification, which is a natural condition on risk measures.
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3.1.1 Examples of risk measures
A famous non-convex risk measure is the Value at Risk (VaR) (Linsmeier and Pearson, 2000), which outputs a
threshold loss l such that the probability of −X exceeding l is smaller than a predefined level
VaRα(X) ≡ inf{l ∈ R | P (−X > l) ≤ 1− α}. (3.5)
A famous convex risk measure is the Entropic risk measure (Fo¨llmer et al., 2004)
ρE =
1
θ
logMX(−θ) = sup
Q∈P
EQ[−X]− 1
θ
D[Q||P ]. (3.6)
HereMX(t) ≡ EP [etX ] is the moment-generating function, andD[·||·] is the KL-divergence (and this is where
“entropic” comes in). We mention that the second representation of ρE holds for all convex risk measures, and
this representation becomes the key to connecting the markets to machine learning (cf. Section 5).
3.2 Rational Choices
Recall that a portfolio that leads to a higher value of f(Xˆ) is preferred. Thus the favourite portfolio of an agent
should be the one that maximises f , which we denote by {w,X}opt. The behaviour of choosing {w,X}opt is
called the rational choice, and an agent is rational if it always chooses {w,X}opt as its trading goal. Since in
our framework f = −ρ, a rational agent will choose will {w,X}opt under the rule of
min
{w,X}
ρ(Xˆ) = min
{w,X}
ρ(w +X). (3.7)
In a market an agent only cares about its own goal (3.7). It seems like this property prevents us from linking
markets to machine learning methods, as the latter always aim to achieve certain global objectives. However,
with a careful design, we can let our markets implicitly define global objectives and make an agent contributes
to the global objective at the same time as it achieves its own goal.
4 Multi-period Trading Markets
In this section we will build our market, a multi-period trading market whose trades are driven by a market
maker. “Multi-period” is used to indicate that the prices of the securities are allowed to vary at different time
steps, and that agents can trade with the market maker in multiple times (Fo¨llmer et al., 2004). The market
maker is introduced to simplify the market mechanism and to make the market run efficiently.
It is difficult to characterise the trading process in the markets with unspecified mechanisms, and those markets
may not run efficiently. For example, there may not exist a consistent agreement among agents on how much
should be paid to buy/sell one share of a security. Moreover, one agent who wants to sell a certain amount
of shares may not find any buyers (Chen and Pennock, 2007). One way to simplify the trading process is
by introducing a market maker (Hanson, 2007). A market maker is a special agent. It is a price maker, who
defines the price for trading each security. All agents are only allowed to trade with the market maker. They
can, however, make a trade at any time as long as they agree to pay under the market maker’s pricing. The
pricing rule of a market maker at time step t is a functional ct : X → R. At different time steps the cost for
purchasing an asset may be different, i.e. it may happen that ct(X) 6= ct′(X) when t 6= t′.
Suppose that an agent has a portfolio {wt−1, Xt−1} at time t−1 and it would like to buy ∆Xt from the market
maker at t. The agent cannot propose an arbitrary price ∆wt for ∆Xt but has to accept the price provided by the
market maker ∆wt = −ct(∆Xt). The updated portfolio is thus restricted to {wt−1−ct(∆Xt), Xt−1 +∆Xt},
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and the updated asset is restricted to Xˆt = Xt−1 + wt−1 + ∆Xt − ct(∆Xt). Now a rational agent only cares
about choosing its optimal purchase amount ∆Xt such that ρ(Xˆt) is minimised:
min
{wt,Xt}
ρ(Xˆt) = min
∆Xt∈X
ρ(Xt−1 + ∆Xt + wt−1 − ct(∆Xt)). (4.1)
This portfolio selection procedure leads to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Select({wt−1, Xt−1}, ρ(·), ct(·)): portfolio selection of a rational agent
Require: portfolio {wt−1, Xt−1}, risk measure ρ(·), pricing rule ct(·)
compute ∆Xt = arg min∆X′t∈X ρ(Xt−1 + ∆X
′
t + wt−1 − ct(∆X ′t)) using (4.1)
Ensure: {∆Xt,−ct(∆Xt)}
We now consider a multi-period market which involves a set A = {1, 2, . . . , N} of agents and a market maker.
Assume that at each round t there is only one agent at ∈ A that trades with the market maker. This assumption
indicates that each agent trades with the market maker separately, and they do not cooperate to make a joint
purchase. {a1, a2, . . . , aT } is thus the trading queue of the market. Since there are multiple agents, we use an
extra subscript to distinguish the portfolios of different agents. For example, an agent n ∈ A’s portfolio at time
t is {wn,t, Xn,t}. The initial values are denoted with the subscript t = 0. We collect all wn,t, Xn,t, Xˆn,t into
vectors wt,Xt and Xˆt, respectively. We assume that agents do not bring in any risky asset at the beginning,
which is a natural assumption since only the market maker can issue securities. This assumption means we
have X0 = 0 and so Xˆ0 = w0.
At time t, only the agent at updates its portfolio by trading with the market maker while all the other agents
keep the same portfolios as at t− 1. Suppose the asset that the agent at would like to purchase is ∆Xat,t, then
for all n ∈ A
Xn,t = Xn,t−1 + 1(n = at)∆Xat,t, (4.2a)
wn,t = wn,t−1 − 1(n = at)ct(∆Xat,t). (4.2b)
Algorithm 2 runs a multi-period trading market.
Algorithm 2 A multi-period market with a set A of agents and a market maker
Require: initial portfolios {w,X0}, risk measures {ρn(·)}, pricing rule ct(·), time period T
for t = 1 to T do
for each agent n ∈ A do
propose {∆Xn,t,−ct(∆Xt)} = Select({wn,t−1, Xn,t−1}, ρn(·), ct(·)) using Algorithm 1
end for
trade happens between the market maker and at
for each agent n ∈ A do
update their portfolios using (4.2)
end for
end for
We can also split Algorithm 2 into two routines, in terms of the market maker and each agent, respectively
(Algorithm 3 and 4). We say this to emphasise the fact that each agent in the market has its own objective
(which is to achieve the optimal portfolio based on its unique preferences), plus a communication with the
market maker.
4.1 Appropriate choice on the pricing rule ct(·)
There has been plenty of work on studying the pricing rule ct(·) of the market maker (Brahma et al., 2012;
Pennock, 2004). A popular class of mechanisms is Hanson’s market scoring rules (Hanson, 2007). It is later
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Algorithm 3 The market maker in a multi-period market
Require: time period T
for t = 1 to T do
publish a pricing rule ct(·)
collect trading request {∆Xn,t} from agents
choose agent at and make trade, ∆Xt ≡ ∆Xat,t
update ct(·)→ ct−1(·)
end for
close the market
Ensure: {at}, {∆Xt}
Algorithm 4 An agent n ∈ A in a multi-period market
Require: initial portfolio {wn,0, Xn,0}, risk measure ρn(·), starting point t = 1
repeat
receive the pricing rule for time t
compute {∆Xn,t,−ct(∆Xn,t)} = Select({wn,t−1, Xn,t−1}, ρn(·), ct(·)) and send its trading request to
the market maker
if trade happens then
Xn,t = Xn,t−1 + ∆Xn,t
wn,t = wn,t−1 − ct(∆Xn,t)
else
Xn,t = Xn,t−1, wn,t = wn,t−1,∆Xn,t = 0
end if
t = t+ 1
until market is closed
Ensure: {wn,t, Xn,t}t=1,2,..., {∆Xn,t}t=1,2,...
formalised by Abernethy et al. (2013), who use a set of reasonable axioms to characterise the pricing mecha-
nism. We apply their result to our framework.
Let ∆Xt ≡ ∆Xat,t be the trade with the market maker at time t. Consider two situations: 1) a trade happens
with the market maker in ∆X; and 2) a trade happens with the market maker in ∆X ′ and is immediately
followed by another trade ∆X ′′, where ∆X = ∆X ′ + ∆X ′′. A natural requirement is that the cost of
purchasing ∆X should be equal to the total cost of purchasing ∆X ′ and ∆X ′′. If we accept this property, then
we can always find a functional c : X → R such that (Abernethy et al., 2013)
ct(∆Xt) = c(∆X1 + · · ·+ ∆Xt−1 + ∆Xt)− c(∆X1 + · · ·+ ∆Xt−1). (4.3)
We say a pricing rule ct is path-independent if it has the form of (4.3), and reload the notation c to represent ct.
5 The Machine Learning Objective of the Multi-period Trading
Markets
Remember that the primary goal of this paper is to establish an intimate connection between machine learning
and our new prediction markets model. Before we start to analyse the multi-period trading markets, we intro-
duce the machine learning context for which we want our markets to be utilised. Many machine learning tasks
could be interpreted under the following generic framework: given a set of data sampled from a space Ω and a
hypothesis space P which contains a class of accessible probabilities on Ω, we would like to find a probability
from P that can best describe the data. Usually we use a functional F : P → R to characterise the “best”
performance, such that the best probability is the one that minimises F . Formally, this involves an optimisation
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problem
min
P∈P
F (P ) (5.1)
For specific problems in which the information comes from different parts of the data or the models, F has a
form of F =
∑
n Fn, the sum of a set of functionals which share the same domain P (see examples in Section
7 for details). We will show that a multi-period market effectively defines and optimises a machine learning
task whose F (P ) =
∑
n Fn(P ).
The connection is established in two steps: first we show that the market does have a global objective, and then
show that under mild conditions the market optimises the dual of a machine learning problem minP∈P
∑
n Fn.
5.1 The global objective of a market
We show that a multi-period trading market minimises a global objective. The optimisation is done sequentially
via the market trading dynamics, that is, an agent will contribute to minimising this global objective as long as
it makes a trade with the market maker. This argument is formalised in the following
Proposition 1 (The global objective of a market). A multi-period market (Algorithm 2) with a path-independent
pricing rule market maker aims to minimise the global objective
L = c(Y ) +
∑
n∈A
ρn(Xn), Y =
∑
n∈A
Xn, (5.2)
by performing a sequential optimisation algorithm, which is implemented by the market trading process (cf.
(4.1) and (4.2)):
∆Xt = arg min∆X′t ρat(Xat,t−1 + ∆X
′
t + wat,t−1 − ct(∆X ′t)), (5.3a)
Xn,t = Xn,t−1 + 1(n = at)∆Xt, (5.3b)
wn,t = wn,t−1 − 1(n = at)ct(∆Xt), (5.3c)
Yt = Yt−1 + ∆Xt, (5.3d)
If the algorithm converges at time t′, i.e. ∆Xt = 0 for all t > t′, then {Xn,t′}, Yt′ achieves a local minimum
of the objective L in (5.2).
Proof. At time t only agent at will trade with the market maker, so ∆Xt = ∆Xat,t. At time t, for any agent
n all quantities calculated before t can be treated as constants as they could no longer be modified. Therefore,
the functional that is minimised in (5.3a) has the same optimal point with the following functional
lt(∆X
′
t) = ρat(Xat,t−1 + ∆X
′
t + wat,t−1 − ct(∆X ′t))− ρat(Xat,t−1 + wat,t−1). (5.4)
Apply the property of translation invariance to lt, we have
lt(∆X
′
t) = ρat(Xat,t−1 + ∆X
′
t)− ρat(Xat,t−1) + ct(∆X ′t). (5.5)
Sum over all lt’s and denote this summation by LT , which is a functional. Then
min
{∆X′t}
LT = min{∆X′t}
T∑
t=1
lt(∆X
′
t) =
T∑
t=1
min
∆X′t
lt(∆X
′
t) =
T∑
t=1
lt(∆Xt). (5.6)
Here ∆Xt’s are the optimal point obtained from (5.3a). Substitute (5.5) to (5.6)
T∑
t=1
lt(∆Xt) =
T∑
t=1
ρat(Xat,t−1 + ∆Xt)− ρat(Xat,t−1) +
T∑
t=1
ct(∆Xt). (5.7)
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Note that at time t for any agent n 6= at it makes no trade ∆Xn,t = 0, and so
ρn(Xn,t−1 + ∆Xn,t)− ρn(Xn,t−1) = 0, ∀n 6= at. (5.8)
The first summation on RHS thus becomes
T∑
t=1
ρat(Xat,t−1 + ∆Xt)− ρat(Xat,t−1)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
n∈A
ρn(Xn,t−1 + ∆Xn,t)− ρn(Xn,t−1)
=
∑
n∈A
ρn(Xn,T )− ρn(Xn,0). (5.9)
Since the pricing rule is path-independent, the second summation on RHS is
T∑
t=1
ct(∆Xt) =
T∑
t=1
ct(Yt)− ct(Yt−1) = c(Yt)− c(0), (5.10)
where Yt =
∑t
τ=1 ∆Xτ and Y0 = 0. Since Xn,0 = 0 and for any t and n 6= at ∆Xn,t = 0, we have
Yt =
t∑
τ=1
∆Xτ =
t∑
τ=1
∆Xaτ ,τ =
t∑
τ=1
∑
n∈A
∆Xn,τ
=
∑
n∈A
t∑
τ=1
∆Xn,τ =
∑
n∈A
Xn,t, ∀t > 0. (5.11)
Finally, substitute (5.9) (5.10) and (5.11) to (5.6) and merge the rest terms we can end up with
min
{∆Xt}
LT = min{∆Xt}
c(YT ) +
∑
n∈A
ρn(Xn,T )− c(0), (5.12)
where YT =
∑
n∈A ∆Xn,T . This is a sequential minimisation scheme for minL. Finally, if the market
converges at time T , we have Xn = Xn,T and Y = YT , leading to at a local minimum of L.
Proposition 1 is the key to understanding the market mechanism. Despite that the market is set up to let agents
behave under their own preferences, the market mechanism ensures that a global objective is established, and
that the agent will contribute to optimising the global objective at the same time as it optimise its own goal.
The trading process thus provides a sensible algorithm for achieving this global objective.
5.2 A primal-dual representation via convex analysis
One concern is that (5.2) is not commonly seen in machine learning problems1. A different view of this
objective should somehow be introduced. In fact, under mild requirements on the form of risk measures
and pricing rules, the global objective forms the dual of the optimisation problem minP∈P
∑
n Fn(P ). The
requirement for the risk measures is convexity (3.4). The requirement for the pricing rules is that it is duality-
based (Abernethy et al., 2013).
1However, to complete our discussion, we show one example that uses (5.2) in Section 7
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5.2.1 More on convex risk measures
Artzner et al. (1999) and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) show that a convex risk measure has a form
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈P
(EQ[−X]− α(Q)) , (5.13)
where P is a set of probabilities on (Ω,F) such that Q is absolutely continuous w.r.t. P and EQ[X] is well
defined. The risk measure decreases as EQ[X] increases but this effect is penalised by a functional α. (5.13) is
in essence a Legendre-Fenchel transform with a slight change on signs (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
5.2.2 Duality-based pricing rules
We keep following the idea of Abernethy et al. (2013) and apply their duality-based pricing rules to our prob-
lem. The authors point out that duality-based pricing rules are well motivated as they meet some natural
conditions such as no-arbitrage. A duality-based pricing rule is path-independent and has a form2
c(X) ≡ sup
Q∈P
(EQ[X]−R(Q)) = R∗(X), (5.14)
where R∗ denotes the Legendre-Fenchel transform of R. Note that in their work R is required to be convex,
but this condition could be relaxed since for any R we could define R′ ≡ (R∗)∗ = c∗ to replace R, as R′ is
always convex (as it is a conjugate dual) and c = (R′)∗ = R∗.
5.2.3 The primal problem
Now we are ready to show
Proposition 2 (The primal problem). For a multi-period market which involves agents who use convex risk
measures in (5.13)and a duality-based pricing rule market maker in (5.14), its global objective is the dual of
min
P∈P
N∑
n=0
Fn(P ), (5.15)
where F0 and Fn are functionals that share the same domain P . Specifically, F0 = R in (5.14), and Fn = αn
where αn is the penalty functional of agent n.
Proof. We use the generalised Fenchel’s duality (Shalev-Shwartz and Singer, 2007) to derive the Lagrange
dual problem of (5.15). The generalised Fenchel’s duality states that the dual of problem (5.15) is
− min
{Xn}∈X
F ∗0 (Y ) +
N∑
n=1
F ∗n(−Xn), Y =
N∑
n=1
Xn, (5.16)
where F ∗n denotes the Legendre-Fenchel transform.
We construct the convex risk measure for each agent n. use (5.13) and choose α = Fn
ρn(X) = sup
Q∈P
(EQ[−X]− Fn(Q)) = F ∗n(−X). (5.17)
For the pricing rule (5.14) we choose R = F0 and obtain c = F ∗0 . Substitute them back to the dual problem
(5.16) and we end up with
− min
{Xn}
L = − min
{Xn}∈X
c(Y ) +
N∑
n=1
ρn(Xn). (5.18)
2Abernethy et al. (2013) represent markets in securities {ξk} and shares {sk}. To be consistent with our framework we change the
representation to assets X (cf. Section 2).
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This matches the global objective L (cf. (5.2)) with a different sign. The negation sign is necessary because
the Lagrange dual problem lower bounds the primal one
− min
{Xn}
L ≤ min
P∈P
N∑
n=0
Fn(P ), (5.19)
and become exact when the strong duality holds (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
Proposition 2 gives us two ways of building the connection between markets and machine learning: 1) If we
model a market using our framework, we could then figure out the global objective of the market and then the
primal problem, which can be solved using machine learning methods. 2) More interestingly, given a machine
learning problem of form (5.15), we could transform it to a market and solve the problem by running the
market, during which we could take the advantage of some market properties, such as distributed environment
and privacy, to gain extra benefits.
6 Related Work
The idea of building models for prediction markets and discussing their relation to optimisation is not novel,
and a few significant progresses have been achieved in the past few years. We will discuss the work that is
closely related to ours.
It is Chen and Vaughan (2010) who first show that what scoring rule market makers do are effectively online
no-regret learning. Their study focuses on the market makers while agents are not directly modelled, which
motivates a framework for the whole market.
Storkey (2011) defines and analyses a type of prediction markets based on definitions on the markets, securi-
ties, and agents. Agents are modelled by EUT, that is, an agent is rational by maximising its expected utility.
By analysing the equilibrium status of the market the author shows that the market can aggregate beliefs from
agents to output a probability distribution over the future events. The author does not discuss precise mar-
ket mechanisms or give the global objective of the market, which makes it difficult to link these markets to
optimisation procedures.
Another important progress is given by Penna et al. (2012), who apply the market scoring rules as the market
mechanism to the framework of Storkey (2011). The work shows that with a large population of agents whose
portfolios are drawn from a demand distribution, the whole market implements stochastic mirror descent. One
concern is that they suggest using EUT to model agents but they do not use it to solve the optimal portfolios
for the agents. This problem is partially solved by Premachandra and Reid (2013), who derives the solution
for a certain type of expected utilities. A similar setting is also studied by Sethi and Vaughan (2013). They
focus more on the convergence of the market dynamics, and show how markets can aggregate beliefs by using
numerical evidences.
6.1 Risk measures and EUT
Here we justify the choice of risk measures as the agent decision rules. First, the output value of a risk
measure can be treated as a risk-free asset and standard linear operations are well defined for it. In comparison,
an expected utility outputs a number that only has abstract meaning, i.e. to measure the degree of agent’s
satisfaction. Additionally, risk measures force translation invariance by definition, but expected utility functions
do not have this property in general. With the help of translation invariance, the wealth w can always be
separated from the risky asset X , which implies that the optimal portfolio does not depend on w. This saves
us from the trouble of associating w with the aggregation weights, as the relationship between them is highly
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inconsistent and varies dramatically under different utilities (Storkey et al., 2012). Finally, we could always
derive convex a risk measure ρu from any expected utility (Fo¨llmer et al., 2004)
ρu(X) ≡ inf{m ∈ R | EP [u(X +m)] ≥ u0}, (6.1)
where P is the personal belief of the agent. In fact, the output of this risk measure is the risk premium, the least
amount of money that one would like to borrow in order to accept this risky asset. Then a sensible decision
rule should be to find an asset that minimise the premium, which leads to our decision rule.
As an example, consider the HARA utility
uH(x) =
1− γ
γ
(
ax
1− γ + b
)γ
, a > 0,
ax
1− γ + b > 0. (6.2)
The resultant convex risk measure is the one who has the following penalty functional
α(Q) =
γ
a
η−1/η(−u0)1/γ E
[(
dQ
dP
)η]1/η
+ (1− γ) b
a
, (6.3)
where 1/η+1/γ = 1. A special case of HARA is given by b = 1 and γ → −∞, which leads to the exponential
utility function uE(x) = − exp(−ax). It is easy to check that the risk measure associated with exponential
utility uE is exactly the entropic risk measure in (3.6) with θ = a (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2002).
7 Examples
In this section we use three examples to illustrate the connections between the multi-period trading markets
and machine learning.
7.1 Opinion Pooling
The opinion pooling problem is a common setting for prediction market models (Barbu and Lay, 2012; Storkey
et al., 2012). Garg et al. (2004) show that the objective of an opinion pool is to minimise a weighted sum of a
set of divergences. Particularly, for logarithmic opinion pool the objective is to
min
P∈P
∑
n
wnD[P ||Pn], (7.1)
where D[·||·] is the KL-divergence and {wn} are weight parameters.
Now consider an log-opinion pool of a set of A probabilities on a finite discrete sample space Ω with K states.
To set up a market that matches the log-opinion pool, we first define a market on the same space Ω and introduce
K Arrow-Debreu securities. We introduce N agents, and assign a unique probability Pn ∈ A to agent n as its
personal belief. According to (3.6), agent n’s risk measure has the form
ρn(sn) =
1
θn
log
K∑
k=1
pke
−θnsn,k , (7.2)
where we let θn match the weight wn by θ−1n = wn. For the sake of simplicity, we choose a logarithmic market
scoring rule market maker (Hanson, 2007)
c(s0) =
1
θ0
log
K∑
k=1
eθ0s0,k . (7.3)
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Figure 1: A market with Arrow-Debreu securities defined on a binary event ω. The experiment setting is similar to the
biased coin market (Penna et al., 2012), in that all agents start with a uniform prior on ω and each one builds its own
posterior belief after a private observation of 5 samples of ω. The difference is here only a finite number N = 10 of agents
are involved. After t = 300 the global objective of the market converges to the negation of (7.4) (upper left, cf. (5.19)),
while the market price converges to a position which is close to the unbiased aggregation, but with a small bias towards
0.5 due to the biased uniform belief of the market maker (upper and lower right, cf. (7.5)).
The market can be run by using Algorithm 2. Two typical simulation results are shown in Figure 1 and 2. The
primal problem of this market is (applying Proposition 1 and 2)
min
P∈P
1
θ0
D[P ||P0] +
∑
n∈A
1
θn
D[P ||Pn], (7.4)
where the domain P = ∆K is the probability simplex in K dimensions and P0 = uniform(K) is the discrete
uniform distribution in ∆K . In this case the optimal P can be analytically solved. Recall that θ−1n = wn and
we have
P ∝
∏
n∈A
P
wn/(θ
−1
0 +
∑
n∈A wn)
n . (7.5)
Since we introduce the market maker, the aggregated belief P is not a pure weighted product of agents’ beliefs,
but with a bias towards P0. However, when the population is sufficiently large such that
∑
n θ
−1
n  θ−10 , the
effect of the market maker could be ignored and we will end up with a pure aggregation of agent beliefs (Penna
et al., 2012).
7.2 Bayesian Update
We give our second example by first setting up a market and then match a machine learning problem to the
market. Let’s build a market on a continuous sample space Ω = R. We only define one security ξ(ω) = ω,
and so the asset X = sω. We introduce only one agent. Again, the agent is characterised by an entropic risk
measures, with coefficient θ1 and P1 = N (µ1, σ21) is the normal distribution. The moment-generating function
in (3.6) is
MX(−θ1) = EP1 [e−θ1sω] = e−θ1sµ1+σ
2
1θ
2
1s
2/2, (7.6)
and so the risk measure is ρ1(s) = −sµ1 + σ21θ1s2/2. For the market maker we use the quadratic market
scoring rule c(s) = θ0s2/2. Now we could run this market using Algorithm 2 with only one agent.
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Figure 2: A market which shares the setting in Figure 1 but with N = 100 agents. After increasing the population the
convergence becomes much slower (upper left and right). The market price does not show a sign of convergence before
t = 500 (lower left and right). Comparatively, the average price quickly converges to the aggregated belief. With more
agents involved, the market maker loses its weight in the aggregation, leading to an aggregated belief that is closer to the
unbiased one. This is expected, as for a large population the market should reproduce the results of the biased coin market
(Penna et al., 2012).
It could be shown that this market implements a Bayesian maximum a posteriori (MAP) update for the Gaus-
sian, in which the prior is provided by the market maker and the likelihood information is provided by the
agent.
Consider the setting of estimating a univariate Gaussian N (µ, σ1). All we need is the sufficient statistics
calculated from a set of N data points D = {x1, x2, . . . , xN}. For clarity of exposition let’s assume that we
only care about the Bayesian updates of the mean parameter µ, and think σ1 is a prefixed constant. Introduce a
Conjugate prior on the mean
p(µ | µ0, σ0) ∝ exp
(
− 1
θ0
(µ− µ0)2
2σ20
)
, (7.7)
where θ−10 is so-called the pseudo count. The posterior is
p(µ | D, µ0, σ0) ∝ p(µ | µ0, σ0)p(D | µ, σ1)
∝ exp
(
− 1
θ0
(µ− µ0)2
2σ20
)
exp
(
−N (µ− x¯)
2
2σ21
)
∝ exp
(
− 1
θ0
(µ− µ0)2
2σ20
− 1
θ1
(µ− µ1)
2σ21
)
, (7.8)
where µ1 = x¯ denotes the sample mean of the data set, and θ1 = N−1. If our goal is to calculate the MAP
distribution then we have an optimisation problem
L = min
µ∈R
1
θ0
(µ− µ0)2
2σ20
+
1
θ1
(µ− µ1)2
2σ21
. (7.9)
Let
F0(µ) ≡ 1
θ0
(µ− µ0)2
2σ20
, F1(µ) ≡ 1
θ1
(µ− µ1)2
2σ21
, (7.10)
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and thus we have L = minµ∈R F0(µ) + F1(µ). Since F0 and F1 are convex, we could apply the Fenchel’s
duality to the problem L, which gives us the following dual problem
− L′ = min
s∈R
F ∗0 (s) + F
∗
1 (−s), (7.11)
where F ∗0 is the Legendre-Fenchel transform of F0
F ∗0 (s) = sup
µ∈R
sµ− F0(s) = sµ0 + 1
2
σ20θ0s
2, (7.12)
and similarly F ∗1 (s) = sµ1 +
1
2σ
2
1θ1s
2. Choose the hyperparameter µ0 = 0, σ0 = 1, and we finally have
− L′ = min
s∈R
θ0
2
s2 +
(
−sµ1 + 1
2
σ21θ1s
2
)
= min
s∈R
c(x) + ρ1(s). (7.13)
This is exactly the agent’s objective. Since s and µ are dual to each other, the market performs the Bayesian
update (MAP estimate) in the dual space of the mean parameters.
7.3 Logistic Regression
In the third example we discuss a classic machine learning problem. Given a data set D = {{xm,ym} | xm ∈
RK ,ym = {+1,−1},m = 1, . . . ,M}, we would like to build logistic regression model with l2-regularisation.
The objective is
L = min
w∈RK
1
M
M∑
m=1
log
(
1 + eym(w·xm)
)
+
λ
2
‖w‖2, (7.14)
where ‖ · ‖ is the l2 norm.
To convert this problem to a market we use (5.2) and Proposition 1. Let the sample space be the space that
generates the data Ω ≡ RK∪{+1,−1} and each future state is associated with a data in Ω, ω = {x, y}. Define
K securities, each of which is ξk(ω) = yxk. We introduce N = K agents, such that the agent n = k is only
interested in trading in the k-th security ξk. Thus the shares of security k held by agent n is sn,k = 1(n = k)wk,
and the asset is Xn = sn · ξ = wnξn. The market inventory is s0 =
∑
n sn = w. Let c(w) be the first term on
the RHS of (7.14) and define the risk measure of agent n as ρn(sn) = λs2n/2. We end up with
L = min
w
c(w) +
K∑
k=1
λ
2
w2k = min{sn}
c(s0) +
N∑
n=1
ρn(sn). (7.15)
Now the market is ready to run under Algorithm 2. In order to show a slightly deeper connection to a specific
learning method, we notice that the objective of agent n at each round is min∆wk,t c(wt−1+∆wk,t)+(wk,t−1+
∆wk,t)
2/2. As the solution to this is not analytic, it is costly to solve for the exactly minimum of this objective
at each time. To get rid of this problem, we could relax the condition that agents behaviour is rationally optimal,
and let the agents accept a portfolio as long as it is better than its current position ρn(sˆn,t) < ρn(sˆn,t−1).
Specifically agents can take steps towards the optimal solution. This can be achieved by the following portfolio
updating rule
∆wk,t = −a d
dwk
(
c(w) +
λ
2
w2k
)∣∣∣∣
w=wt−1
, (7.16)
where a > 0 is adjusted such that ρn(sˆn,t) < ρn(sˆn,t−1). In practice a could be chosen by backtracking line
search (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004). The market we designed above effectively implements a coordinate
descent algorithm (Luo and Tseng, 1992).
Note that, instead of introducing N = K agents, we can match the logistic regression problem by using only
one agent and allowing it to trade all securities. This will result in a standard gradient descent method.
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8 Conclusion
This paper establishes and discusses a new model for prediction markets. We use risk measures instead of
expected utility to model agents, which results in an analytical market framework. We show that our market as
a whole optimises certain global objective through its market dynamics. Based on this result, we make intimate
connections between machine learning and markets.
One future work would be conducting a detailed analysis of this framework using the tools of convex optimi-
sation (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004). A particularly interesting topic is to find the conditions under which
the market will converge. As we have observed, the stochasticity comes in when a large population of agents
are involved, which is believed to be the nature of any real market (Penna et al., 2012).
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